The outstanding quality in John Howland's mind was integrity. He thought slowly, even painfully, assimilating his experience almost inch by inch. What he learned from it became an essential part of himself. He was one of those men who find themselves late and are almost compelled to force themselves to look at life. But in the process of self-discovery there developed in him an awareness of purpose, a resolution, and a courage that made certain for him a career of real distinction. For he had the type of character that never deserts an objective that it is determined to gain. He wrestled with his difficulties like a swimmer who battles with a heavy sea; but, when they were overcome, their defeat came to mean for him a mastery and definition of ends which gave him an inner assurance certainly destined to make him a man of significance. His early death was more than a loss to us who cared for him. It deprived the law of one who had come to see in its service the opportunity of a public devotion which illuminated his whole life. This paper is but a fragment of the purpose he had shaped for himself. It is yet, his friends believe, sufficient in its penetration and care, to make it clear why those who loved him recognized in his personality a promise destined to a high fulfilment.
HAROLD J. LASKI THE INSTITUTION of reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act invariably precipitates a conflict between secured creditors on the one hand, and the debtor, its stockholders and subordinate creditors on THE 3:4LE LAW JOURNAL the other. Secured creditors desire to convert their collateral into cash at the earliest opportunity consistent with a maximum return on their investment; while the other interests prefer to maintain the collateral in staiu quo, in the hope that the security will eventually be included in the property of the reorganized company. This latter purpose can be achieved only by enjoining the secured creditors from enforcing their claims, on the authority of the Rock Island case.' To the unwilling secured creditor this infringement of contract rights causes grave concern." but to the other interests lostponement represents a fair measure necessary to the success of the cooperative effort to reorganize. These conflicting desires must be reconciled by the reorganization courts with ncgligible assistance from the decided cases, for the applicable rules are still being formulated. In order to obtain some practical basis for these rules it is nccc-;sarv to understand fully the effects of an order restraining secured creditors upon the business of banking and finance, and the practice of corp crate reorganizations.
T.
For the purposes of this study, a primary distinction should be made betveen long and short term debts. A long term debt of a railroad or industrial corporation is usually evidenced by a bond or other instrument s-cured by a mortgage or deed of trust covering specific physical property; a short term debt, on the other hand, is generally evidenced by a collateral note or trust bond secured by a pledge of specific securities owned by he debtor.' Although the difference in the form of the security device is not without legal import, the significance of the discrimination lies in the diversity in comnercial function between long and short term secured credits and in the degree of liquidity of the collateral securing the debts.
Long term l)orrowing has become the recognized and orthodox method of obtaining capital for industrial development. 4 This form of borrowing is characterized by the ultimate security of the collateral rather than by immediate liquidity. Experience has demonstrated that even in the absence of judicial restraint the collateral securing a long term debt cannot ordinarily be reduced to cash. Theoretically the bondholder or his representative has the power to foreclose and sell the collateral upon default and to apply the proceeds toward the payment of principal or interest. In practice, however, this power rarely-if ever-can result in the conversion of collateral into cash. The size and complexity of modem industrial enterprise make real liquidation of large mortgage debts impossible; an independent buyer who is prepared to pay a fair price can seldom be found in times of economic stress, and consequently a forced sale would be ruinous to creditors and debtors alike. For these reasons foreclosures of railroad or industrial mortgages have not resulted in sales in the ordinary business sense, but in reorganizations.' Briefly. the procedure is that mortgage assets are bid in at a nominal price by a representative of the bondholders, and the property is transferred to a new company in which the bondholders receive in exchange for the old bonds a fractional interest as provided by the plan of reorganization.' After the payment of all the foreclosure expenses from the small amount realized from the sale, whatever cash remains is made available to dissenters exclusively. These well-known infirmities, immanent in collateral securing long term obligations, apparently have never presented any serious impediment to the sale of long term bonds. Nor, presumably, where the debtor is undergoing reorganization pursuant to Section 77 or Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, will a restraint of the right of foreclosure have a disturbing effect on the long term money market.
The situation in the case of short term credits, however, is directly the contrary.
7 Short term credits are usually provided by commercial banks, by investment bankers or others interested in the preservation of the debtor corporation, and, in some cases, by government agencies or by the public through its subscription to issues of short term notes. These short term credits owe their existence to the exigencies of temporary financing; they constitute a type of emergency security which comes 6. In cases where the mortgage is owned by a single creditor the problem is not quite so complex, but liquidation of the security i; rarely attained. The mortgagee will usually buy in the property, in many instances only after a protracted and expensive foreclosure proceeding, and he kvill probably be required to hold the property indefinitely for a rise in the market. See Oppenheim, Sales of Property in Bankruptcy (1934) into popular use during periods of acute economic depression. 8 Railroads and industries unable to meet fixed charges and operating expenses must resort to borrowing in order to escape the waste and expense incident to bankruptcy or reorganization.' But at these times the stringent money market makes it impossible to borrow long term funds by the sale of bonds at reasonable rates in the open market. 10 It becomes essential, therefore, to borrow from the banker on short term paper secured by collateral of a more fluid nature. Demand for collateral is particularly apparent in periods of banking difficulties, when the volume of frozen bank loans is mounting in proportion to threatened extraordinary demands by depositors. In the usual case, the collateral will consist chiefly of securities owned by the debtor, including securities of the debtor or its affiliated companies." Liquidity is insured by the terms of pledge agreements, which ordinarily provide that collateral may be sold by the pledgee immediately upon default. In actual practice this ideal * rapid conversion of collateral into cash -is not always attained in cases involving sales of a considerable amount of collateral. In these instances collateral is frequently bought in by the creditor who may dispose of the securities on the open market from time to time.' 2 Despite the imperfections of the pledge device in that regard, however, this characteristic -liquidity -is so fundamental that any restriction upon the exercise of the power of sale results in serious apprehension in banking circles and brings forth the prediction that short term credit may not be available in the future. 13 As one court said, "Nothing would be more disturbing to transactions of that kind . . . ,,14 Prior to the adoption of Sections 77 and 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, the distinction between long and short term credit was recognized by 8. DEwiNG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 939. 9. In the single year 1932, the railroads issued over $1,000,000,000 in mortgage bonds; the bulk of these bonds were issued as collateral securing short term loans of approximately $650,000,000. U. S. Daily, Jan. 
(1932).
10. DEwINa, op. cit. supra note 4, at 940, n. e., 941, n. f.
11.
On the pledge of the debtor's own bonds see Hatch, loc. cit. supra note 7.
12. E.g., collateral held by short term bank creditors of Insull Utilities, Inc., was [Vol. 46: 1109 bankruptcy and reorganization courts, though in most cases not for the reasons here presented. In bankruptcy it was generally held that the court had jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure of a mortgage'G if the necessary conditions were present 16 but had no jurisdiction to forbid the sale of pledged securities in accordance with the terms of the pledge contract. 7 A similar rule prevailed in equity reorganization practice.' 8 Since the pledge contract is characteristic of short term financing, the rule against restraining foreclosure sales in effect recognized tile difference between long and short term credits in the need for liquidity. But, except for isolated cases 9 the distinction between foreclosure of mortgages and pledges was placed not upon that ground, but upon the theory that summary bankruptcy power depended upon actual or constructive possession of the assets by the debtor at the time of the petition. 0 That the distinction is legalistic rather than functional is apparent from statements that the sale of pledged property could not be enjoined even in "Millions of dollars are daily lent upon like collateral, which fluctuates from hour to hour; unless the pledgee is free to choose his time to sell, his security may disappar. The same is not indeed true of shares like those at bar, or of notes, neither of which vary rapidly in value; but the same legal reasons exist as to them also. The pledgee. having taken possession of the documents, supposes himself for just that reason to be the sole judge of his necessities, and lends on that understanding. So long as he keeps within the terms of the agreement, he need not concern himself with the pledgor's fate, or that of his creditors, who must stand in his shoes . .
20. See cases in notes 17 and 18, supra.
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cases where the pledge device had been used to secure long term debts. 1 Although based on principles of property rather than commercial practice, the discrimination in favor of pledge contracts as distinguished from mortgage contracts undoubtedly afforded a desirable means of insuring liquidity in short term financing. It is probably true that "business has adapted its transactions to this line" 2 by using the pledge device in short term loans. Thus, prior to the enactment of Sections 77 and 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, business needs and legal concepts had attained a position of approximate assimilation.
II.
From the creditor's point of view the enactment of Sections 77 and 77B of the Bankruptcy Act accentuated the desire for an unrestricted right to foreclose, particularly in the case of short term debts. Under these amendments it became possible for two-thirds of a class to bind the remainder to any plan of reorganization 23 found by the court 24 to be fair and equitable. 2 As applied to long term creditors this provision is not a radical innovation; it is merely an improved method of accomplishing the same result as the sale in an equity reorganization. 2 But, as applied to short term creditors such as commercial banks, the provision carries a definite threat. A single short term creditor might be compelled to accept a plan of reorganization which involved a drastic change in his status, such as the surrender of all collateral in exchange for stock. This was not the case in equity reorganizations. While the plan must be found to be fair and equitable, the sharp change from previous reorganization practice in this regard and the different concepts of an impartial plan naturally breed distrust among short term creditors and increase their desire to escape, if possible, from the threat of coer- Under Section 77B(b) (5)28 a plan may be imposed on an entire class despite unanimous opposition by the members of the class. This can be accomplished in any of four ways :"-first, by transfer, sale, or retention of the property subject to existing liens; second, by sale of the property at a fair upset price with a transfer of the liens to the proceeds of the sale; third, by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of these liens or, at the creditors' election, of the value of the securities awarded to these liens under the plan; or finally, by any method which will afford adequate protection under the circumstances of the particular case.
30
With the possible exception of the fourth alternative, the Act probably insures long term creditors a degree of protection at least as effective as that offered them in equity reorganizations.
3 " But as applied to short term secured creditors the Act has again somewhat drastically changed reorganization practice. Before these amendments the short term pledgeecreditor could always sell his collateral at public sale and, if necessary, bid it in himself to hold for a possible rise in price; but he is now faced with the. threat that his collateral may be valued during a period of rock-bottom prices and the cash equivalent paid to him in lieu of it." Furthermore, under the fourth alternative the court apparently has broad and discretionary power to force upon an entire class of short or long term creditors any plan which it thinks will "equitably and fairly protect 31. 2 GERDEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 1057. This generalization may he inapplicable to the single mortgage creditor. Under equity and bankruptcy practice, he might be enjoined from collecting his debt if the debtor's estate had a potential equity in the property, but he was not reorganized out of his collateral against his will. See note 16, supra.
32. The short term bank creditor is thus placed in a position analogous to that of the dissenter in equity reorganizations.
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the creditor under all the circumstances of the particular case." While experience acquired since the enactment of those amendments does not indicate that their coercive provisions often result in serious injury to the secured creditors," 3 the possibility of loss is sufficient to cause secured creditors to try to withdraw from the reorganization tribunal by the foreclosure route.
Thus, at the inception of a 77B proceeding the secured creditor may adopt one of several courses: he may decide to participate in the reorganization, despite the risk that an unfavorable plan may be imposed upon him and that he may be injured by the delay inherent in all reorganizations, or he may choose to take no chances and decide to escape, if possible, from this threat of coercive action by foreclosing on his collateral. That the short term creditor will choose the second alternative, if it is available, goes without saying. This decision raises two problems: first, whether the reorganization court may enjoin both the long and short term creditor classes from foreclosing on their collateral; and second, if such power exists, when it may be exercised. The Supreme Court decision in the Rock Island case 34 definitely answers the first question but leaves the second in a state of doubt and ambiguity.
Shortly after filing a petition under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, the Rock Island Railway moved for an injunction restraining five bank creditors and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from selling the securities pledged to secure their claims. The railroad owed these short term creditors in the aggregate less than $18,500,000, and as security for these obligations had deposited collateral of an aggregate par value of over $54,000.000. Except for one item of $1,400,000, the collateral was of three kinds: bonds of the debtor railroad, bonds of subsidiaries which the debtor had guaranteed, and bonds of subsidiaries which the debtor had not guaranteed. The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals had found that the sale of this system collateral would completely prevent the preparation and consummation of a plan of reorganization. This conclusion, which the Supreme Court accepted largely upon the findings of the lower courts, 35 was based on the contentions that the 33. In fact, the courts seem to have indicated an extremely conservative approach to this question, and have been reluctant to approve any plan unless all classes of secured creditors consent to it. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) A. 9th, 1936 
SECURED CLAIMS UNDER 77 AND 77B
sale of the collateral might precipitate similar action by creditors holding $145,000,000 of additional system collateral, and that the sale of this collateral from time to time during the reorganization proceedings might require changes in details of the plan which would involve new and, perhaps, difficult reconciliations of the views of many essentially diverse interests and might force an abandonment of the proceedings.'G Upon considering all the factors, the Supreme Court held that under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 3 7 a reorganization court had power to enjoin a short term creditor secured by a pledge of the debtor's securities. This involved an abandonment of the long established theory that a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction only over property in custodia legisa such as mortgages held by long term creditors, and that in the absence of possession, as in cases where securities were held in pledge by short term creditors, no injunction could be issued. 3 " There was no express provision in Section 77 upon which this result could be founded. But in its desire to uphold Section 77 and promote its operation and effectiveness, the Court found sufficient basis for the new rule in the fact that a bankruptcy court is "a virtual court of equity," and further in the general provisions of Section 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section 262 of the Judicial Code -neither of which had theretofore been considered available for this purpose. This decision enables the reorganization court to cut off the escape of both long and short term creditors from the delays and dangers inevitable in reorganization proceedings. It is a powerful weapon. If 36. It was contended that since a substantial amount of the collateral consisted of bonds of the debtor, or bonds of the debtor's subsidiaries which the debtor had guaranteed, the sale of these securities would have disturbed the mechanics of the reorganization by creating new classes of creditors and increasing the amount of claims outstanding in existing classes.
37. Although the decision was based on the B.%NrmuPrcY Acr § 77, the principle is applicable to 77B proceedings generally. In re Prudence Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d) 2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; In re Prudence Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) .
39. The reasoning of the Court seems to cast great doubt on existing bankruptcy and equity reorganization precedents. If under § 77 a bankruptcy court may enjoin a pledgee where a foreclosure threatens the success of a reorganization, why cannot the same court enjoin a pledgee Where a sale would hinder successful liquidation? That question was specifically reserved by the Court for future determination.
40. It should also be noted that the Court considered constitutional objections to the exercise of the power to restrain and overruled them on the ground that the remedy, not the contract right, was being impaired. Realistic bankers may disagree. See Paton, supra note 2, at 127.
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hastily and improvidently used, this power is capable of inflicting injurious consequences upon both creditor and debtor interests, particularly in the field of short term finance.
As already pointed out, liquidity is the essential and predominant characteristic of short term finance. If the use of injunctions becomes widespread, banks and other sources of short term credit, 41 faced with the delay,"-expense and dangers of a reorganization proceeding, will avoid making loans which may sustain a hard-hit company long enough for it to survive a depression. 3 It follows that large railroad and industrial corporations may be compelled to issue long term bonds during periods of unfavorable markets at excessive discounts. 4 4 In that case, the effect would be to swell the debt structure and perhaps permanently burden the debtor with greater fixed charges. If this avenue of temporary financing is not available, bankruptcy would seem the only other course.
And if creditor interests become fearful of the dangers of promiscuous injunctions, foreclosures will become more frequent during the crucial period in which the debtor is striving to escape bankruptcy. Short term creditors who might otherwise be inclined to grant debtors reasonable indulgence, apprehensive of an unreasonable delay, will naturally rush to foreclose whenever it becomes fairly evident that resort to the reorganization or bankruptcy statutes will be made. The close relationship that often exists between the borrowing corporations and their 42. Protracted delay has been especially characteristic of the reorganization of American railroads. Between 1894 and 1931 the average duration of the railroad receiverships of roads operating more than 100 miles was in excess of 4 years, and apparently there is not much promise that proceedings tinder § 77 will be materially expedited. Many have been pending for over three years and none has been completed; one has been dismissed. See 49 I. C. C., STATISTICS OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES (1937) S-9.
43. It seems agreed that the danger that short term creditors may not be permitted to sell their collateral has a direct and adverse effect on the short term credit market.
Paton, supra note 2, at 126. For this reason Congress amended § 77 (j) of the Bankruptcy Act to deprive the court of power to enjoin the enforcement of equipment trust obligations, which are essentially of a short term nature. The principal argument in favor of the amendment was that it was necessary to restore the confidence of the market in obligations of that kind. Further, in enacting § 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress limited jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of debts to cases where the court had actual or constructive possession of the property because any other rule would "further restrict credit." SEN. REP. No. 1215 , 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933 bankers will insure the bankers of timely .warning of the impending event.
In addition, the participation of short term creditors in the reorganization will result in increased bankers' domination. During the reorganization process this may be manifested by banker control over reorganization committees 45 -with a resulting increase in reorganization fees and expenses. 40 After reorganization this mastery may appear through bank ownership of a majority 7 or a controlling minority of the voting stock. 4 " In cases where creditors receive a controlling share of the stock of the reorganized company, their desire for liquidity will create conflicts as to the policies of the new company. A conservative policy of quick realization of assets might fit the desires of bank creditors, but other interests which have sustained a much greater loss as a result of the failure of the enterprise, hoping for larger future gains, will prefer to keep the corporation's property intact 0 The banker is likely to sell his block of stock in the new company at the first favorable opportunity. This may result in a transfer of control from the commercial banker to the investment banker and a resultant uncertainty of policy during the early and delicate period of the new company's existence, a development which may not be to the best interests of the minority shareholders."' 46. Under § 77B (c) (9) the district court has discretionary power to make an allowance out of the estate to creditors' attorneys for services rendered in the reorganization. The inclusion of pledged property in the estate undergoing reorganization increases administrative costs.
47. An instance where secured bank creditors were awarded voting control of a reorganized corporation is presented in In re Middle West Utilities Co., N. D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1935 ; in that case the bank creditors received 51.65% of the stock in the new company.
48. See generally Bn.E AVD 341EA%-S, THE MoDRN CoRo,*rAoN-,ztD PnIVArz PRoPETY (1932) .
49. This problem worried the unsecured creditors and shareholders in In re Middle West Utilities Co., N. D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1935. It was finally solved when the bank creditors agreed to name only four of the nine directors during the initial term of office and to include in the by-laws a provision that no asset having a book value in excess of $500,000 could be sold without consent of two-thirds of the entire hoard; the controlling directors were named by the court. In this manner it was hoped that the danger of an immediate liquidation of the new company by the banking interests would be avoided.
50. An illustration of this point is also presented by the Middle West Utilities reorganization. Recently two investment bankers announced that they had purchased from the Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Company 475,000 shares, constituting 14.3% of all outstanding shares, which the bank held in the reorganized company. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1936, p. 31, col. 5. 19371 1119
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Eliminating the threat of a sale of the collateral likewise removes a powerful incentive for consummating and completing a plan. Within the sheltering haven of an injunction, the debtor may simply wait -at the expense of the creditor. If waiting proves the wrong policy, the creditor loses. If conditions change for the better, the creditor is paid off or a compromise reached -all, apparently, at the option of the debtor. This situation results from the change in bargaining power incident to the injunction. A reorganization is essentially a bargaining process between creditors and security holders; the final plan turns largely on the position of the respective parties. A creditor able to foreclose has one position. A creditor unable to foreclose has another; separated by injunction from mortgage collateral, he has almost no bargaining power at all, and may be dealt with lightly in the timing of the reorganization.
In short, if exercised without discrimination, the power to restrain the enforcement of secured creditors' claims may destroy the sources of short term credit and thereby force needy borrowers into bankruptcy; it may precipitate foreclosures by secured creditors upon the first indication that their debtors contemplate resorting to the reorganization statutes: it may increase reorganization costs and expenses; it may enhance banker-control of the reorganization and the new company; and finally, it may remove an effective stimulus to speedy reorganization. To avoid these consequences, it is essential that the power be sparingly exercised.
Once it is recognized that the power to restrain the sale of collateral should be employed with caution, the limitations beyond which the Rock Island case should not be applied appear with greater clarity.
First, under the Rock Island case, secured creditors may be restrained from selling their collateral "if a sale would so hinder, obstruct and delay the preparation and consummation of a plan of reorganization as probably to prevent it."'" Whether an injunction will be granted even in such cases rests in the court's discretion. No distinction was made in this respect between short term (pledgee) and long term (mortgagee) creditors. But the Court did point out that "A claim that injurious consequences will result to the pledgee or the mortgagee may not, of course, be disregarded by the district court; but it presents a question addressed not to the power of the court but to its discretion . . . " Thus, the district court may take into consideration the fact that an injunction restraining the sale of collateral securing short term debts constitutes a much greater destruction of the creditors' expectations than an in- 52. Id. at 677.
[Vol. 46: 1109 junction restraining the sale of collateral securing long term indebtedness. Because of this and the other considerations already mentioned, a stronger showing may be required before the court will exercise its discretion in the case of short term debts. While the powers of the court are the same, whether long or short term creditors are involved, the considerations controlling the exercise of the discretionary power are different. And the burden of proving that the power should be exercised clearly rests with those who desire that a restraining order be issued or maintained.
3
Second, injunctions should be granted only when the threatened sale may reasonably be expected seriously to impede or destroy the effort to reorganize. The Rock Island case presented such a situation. The collateral, which was worth more than the outstanding debts, consisted almost entirely of bonds issued by the debtor or bonds of debtor's subsidiaries, many of which had been guaranteed by the debtor. The sale of this collateral might well have precipitated sales by other creditors, and a resultant continuing fluctuation of outstanding claims. As the court pointed out, that, in turn, "might require such change of detail in the plan, entailing new and perhaps different reconcilements of views among many and conflicting interests, as to force an abandonment of the proceeding." ' A similar determination may be expected where the collateral held by secured creditors constitutes an integral and necessary part of the debtor's property without which the debtor cannot continue in business; where the sale of the collateral would destroy a valuable equity of the debtor ;r5 or where because of abnormal market conditions the sale might result in an unreasonably large deficiency claim which would overbalance the claims of other interests and threaten the success of the reorganization proceedingsr ' 6 Third, an injunction should not be granted unless it appears that the debtor will be reorganized within a reasonable time. Reorganization proceedings have in many cases become a haven of refuge for well-meaning but deluded debtors for whom there is no hope of salvation. Without any real equity in their properties, most of which are pledged or encumbered by mortgages, and without profitable sources of income, they cling to their corporate lives, hoping that a miracle may rescue them from disaster. In other cases, the rehabilitation of the debtor can be
